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INTRODUCTION
Holy lands are significant in many religious faiths. Their sacred
character can arise from human acts of consecration of buildings,
shrines, and burial sites; from miraculous events; or from the pres-
ence of revered persons. Of late, we can add places of great tragedy.
Or it can inhere in sites' natural condition.' Beliefs of the latter kind
are usually held by long-established peoples. In the United States,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, these beliefs are an important
part of the faiths of original inhabitants-Native Americans, Aborigi-
nals, Maori, and First Nations, respectively. The central aim of this
paper is to explain, evaluate, and compare legal protections for in-
digenous religions when a sacred site is found on government land in
these nations.
The four nations have well-established and highly effective re-
gimes of private land ownership. When a sacred site is owned by be-
lievers, or by tribal societies associated with them, protection is either
straightforward or an internal question for the tribal society. Con-
versely, when a site is privately owned by others, legal protection of
believers' interests in the site is limited or absent. Moreover, privately
owned land is more likely to have been developed in ways that are in-
consistent with a continuing sacred site, while much government land
remains in a relatively natural state. Hence, legal protection for an
active, religious interest in land not owned by believers mostly con-
cerns land owned by governments.
In the nations under review, much land is owned by various levels
of government, and all or most of the land was at one time the prop-
erty of indigenous inhabitants. At the times when these governments
purchased or seized the land from native peoples, traditional relig-
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ions were being eclipsed by Christian conversions often aided by gov-
ernmental policies, and governments directly suppressed some relig-
ious practices. These actions weakened the influence of traditional
religious interests on the selection of land that natives retained. In
many situations, particularly in Australia, very little land was retained
at all. As a result, many sacred sites were acquired from native peo-
ples, and those that remain in any sort of undeveloped state are al-
most all government-owned.
In recent years, indigenous groups have had modest success in re-
acquiring land. Some of the land has religious significance, which is
often the reason why return of that particular land was sought.4 Po-
litical efforts to extend these gains are ongoing. However, the prin-
cipal focus of this paper is on religious interests in land that remains
in government ownership, and to a limited extent, in land privately
owned by nonadherents of traditional religions.
I. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
A just state ought to recognize religious freedom claims by adher-
ents of its minority faiths.5 In particular, religious claims of indige-
nous peoples should receive legal recognition, protection, and ac-
commodation. Many people find the deepest meanings of their lives
in religious practices, yet those practices for Maori, Native Americans,
First Nations, and the Aboriginal peoples of Australia have a sorry his-
tory of repression.6
Legal protection for sacred sites on government land can be based
either on laws and policies specifically designed to this end, or on
general protections for religious freedom in statutes or constitutions.
The four nations under review offer complex variations on these legal
themes.
Many religious freedom claims are accommodated through politi-
cal processes and by common law rules. This is obviously an easier
path when a religious community comprises a large part of the elec-
torate, as does Christianity in the nations examined here. Histori-
cally, this was not the case for indigenous religions in these nations,
2 SeeA. GRENFELL PRICE, WHITE SETrLERSAND NATIVE PEOPLES (1950) (detailing missionary
activities and messianic indigenous movements).
See HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND (1987) (presenting the history of the dispos-
session of Aboriginal land).
4 See infra notes 28-29, 59-65, 78, 109-10 and accompanying text.
5 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18 (1948), at http://www.un.org/
rights/50/decla.htm (last visited Jan. .9, 2003); Religious Discrimination and Related Violations of
Helsinki Commitments: Report to the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Re-
ligion, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (Vienna, Mar. 22, 1999), at
http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/osce99/99reldisOl.htm#Overview (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
6 See infra notes 15, 90 and accompanying text.
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and Christian dominance fostered policies to promote conversion of
native people, thus suppressing their traditional faiths. Accommoda-
tion was usually to the political will of the powerful, rarely to unique
needs of minority religions. 7
More recently, there has been a shift, and political recognition of
indigenous religions has increased significantly. Many religious
groups in the four nations have become more tolerant of each other
and more inclined to work in concert for accommodations for all
faiths.' One subject of this paper is to examine what has and has not
been achieved politically.
When religious adherents do not succeed politically, they can seek
judicial review of an adverse decision. When they do succeed politi-
cally, other persons affected may sue to challenge accommodations
made to them. Another major change of recent decades has been
greatly increased access of traditional religious groups to legislators,
lawyers and courts. There are more legal challenges by native per-
sons and groups and more political accommodations to indigenous
groups that can be challenged by others. As a result, intense and fas-
cinating religious conflicts have emerged in the law reports. When
these disputes involve religious uses of government land, they are a
central concern of this paper.
Defining religion can be a challenge in any dispute about relig-
ious freedom. So long as the issue is addressed politically, it is simply
one of the terms of political discourse. But when judicial review is
sought under statutes or constitutional provisions that protect relig-
ion but not culture or other ethical concerns or group interests, the
distinction can become crucial to judicial resolution and can in turn
raise difficult questions about equal treatment. The issue has special
relevance to indigenous religions, which often have less distinct
boundaries from culture than does Christianity. Conversely, when
legal protections equate religion with culture, heritage, conscience,
or other interests, religion can become relatively diminished in im-
portance.
7 See, e.g., Raymond J. Demallie, The Lakota Ghost Dance: An Ethnohistorical Account, in DAVID
G. HACKETIT, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 329, 333-35 (1995).
8 This willingness is illustrated by (a) the growth of interfaith groups, see, e.g., Hill Connec-
tions, Social Justice Teachings, Documents, and More, at http://hillconnections.org/jt/inf.htm (last
visited Jan. 8, 2003); ReligiousTolerance.org, Local Groups Promoting Interfaith Dialog, at
http://www.religioustolerance.org/tol_loca.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2003); (b) by common
cause to support legislation aiding all faiths, see, e.g., infra note 103 and accompanying text; and
(c) by majority support for laws aiding minority faiths, see infra passim.
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II. FOUR NATIONS9
A. New Zealand
New Zealand was first settled about a millennium ago by Maori,
mariners from other parts of Polynesia. Like other societies with
close ties to the land, Maori traditions attribute sacred character to
places, flora, and fauna throughout the land they named Aotearoa.' °
After European contact many Maori became Christians, but practice
of their religion also continued, both apart from and accompanying
Christian worship.'
1. General Protections of Religious Freedom
For most of its history, New Zealand addressed issues of religious
freedom under the rules and practices of its Westminster constitution
and the common law." The nation had familiar provisions for
church tax exemptions and the like." Majority rule meant privileges
for dominant Christians, yet by comparative world standards, there
was and is a strong tradition of religious freedom. 14  Crown land,
comprising more than half the surface of the nation, includes many
Maori sacred sites that received no distinct legal protection. 5 Laws of
recent vintage have substantially changed this legal landscape.
New Zealand has recently taken limited steps toward "higher law"
rights. In 1990, Parliament enacted the Bill of Rights Act (BOR), a
statutory declaration of rights worded similarly to other modern hu-
9 Because this paper was prepared for a North American audience and readership, it as-
sumes greater background knowledge about the legal systems and indigenous peoples of Can-
ada and the United States than about New Zealand and Australia.
10 See Andrew Sharp, Blood, Custom, and Consent: Three Kinds of Mdori Groups and the Challenges
They Present to Governments, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 9 (2002) (describing the Maori people).
See, e.g., Statistics New Zealand, 2001 Census of Population and Dwellings-Maori tables,
Table 17a -Religious Affiliation, at http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/ProdServ
.nsf/htmldocs/Maori (click on "2001 Census of Population and Dwellings - Mdori tables," then
on "Table 17a, Religious Affiliation.") (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (listing Christians, Maori-
Christians, and Maori as separate categories of religious affiliation).
12 See Constitution Act, 1986 (enacting modern version of Westminster constitution).
13 See Butterworths Laws of New Zealand, Religion and Churches 21-23.
14 See Paul Rishworth, Coming Conflicts over Freedom of Religion, in RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS-THE
NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS AC 1993, at 225-28 (Grant
Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 1995).
15 Article 3 of the Treaty of Waitangi, made in 1840 between most Maori tribes and the
Crown, provides broad protection for Maori interests, but like foreign treaties, it had not been
judicially enforceable absent legislative recognition. In recent years, legislation has provided
for indirect enforcement of the Treaty, and challenges have been made to the traditional rule.
See New Zealand Maori Council v. Att'y-Gen. [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 641, 666-67 (C.A.) (enforcing
safeguards against actions inconsistent with the Treaty).
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man rights codes, national and international.16 It includes strongly
worded protections of religious freedom and equality. BOR section
13 affirms "the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and
belief." Section 15, more functionally, affirms every person's "right to
manifest that person's religion or belief in worship, observance, prac-
tice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and
either in public or in private." Section 19 states that every person has
the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of
"[r] eligious belief' and of "l[e] thical belief, which means the lack of a
religious belief, whether in respect of a particular religion or relig-
ions or all religions.""v And section 20 affirms that a "person who be-
longs to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority in New Zealand
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of
that minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practise the relig-
ion, or to use the language, of that minority. '
Judicial enforcement of the BOR is limited by its section 4, which
retains parliamentary supremacy by providing that no statute in con-
flict with a provision of the BOR shall be held invalid. At the same
time, courts have opportunities for enforcement under section 6,
which requires that when a statute can be given a meaning consistent
with the BOR, "that meaning shall be preferred." There are not yet
settled precedents determining how these provisions should be ap-
plied. 9
The Human Rights Act 1993 (HRA) followed, expanding the anti-
discrimination section of the BOR and applying to private as well as
public actors. HRA section 151, like section 4 of the Bill of Rights
Act, barred invalidations of inconsistent statutes, but section 151 ex-
pired on December 31, 2001. 20 In 1993, Parliament enacted an ap-
portionment plan for the House of Representatives itself that on its
16 Principally the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. See Paul Rishworth, The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights, in
RIGHIS AND FREEDOMS, supra note 14, at 14.
17 BOR § 19 incorporates these and other grounds of discrimination from the Human
Rights Act, 1993, a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute. See infra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.
is See discussion infra text accompanying note 26.
19 The leading judgment relying on BOR § 4 is probably Quilter v. Att'y-Gen. [1998] 1
N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.) (finding Marriage Act in conflict with lesbian couples' equality claim). See
Paul Rishworth, Reflections on the Bill of Rights After Quilter v. Attorney-General (1998) N.Z. L. REV.
683. Leading judgments relying on BOR § 6 and BOR § 4 are Moonen v. Film & Literature Bd. of
Review [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9 (C.A.) (interpreting Film, Videos, and Publications Classification Act
1993 to impinge as little as possible on freedom of expression) and Ministry of Transport v. Noort
[1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260 (C.A.) (finding that driver subjected to roadside sobriety test was entitled
to consult a lawyer by telephone).
20 See Paul Rishworth, Review: Human Rights (2001) N.Z. L. REV. 217, 217-19 (analyzing the
function of section151).
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face requires a three-fourths vote of the House to alter. Under the
theory of parliamentary supremacy, a future House could repeal this
law by a simple majority, but it is quite unlikely to do so.
The BOR and Human Rights Act provisions on religious freedom
and equality have been applied in decisions of the Court of Appeal
(for most matters the nation's highest court), but none involved
Maori religious interests or suggested how the court would approach
a sacred sites claim.2 The most pertinent reported judgment is that
of the High Court in Zdrahal v. Wellington City Council Appellant
painted two swastikas on the outside of his house. Neighbors com-
plained, and an officer served an abatement notice on him under a
statute authorizing suppression of anything "noxious, dangerous, of-
fensive, or objectionable to such an extent that is has... an adverse
effect on the environment. 24 Appellant claimed interference with his
freedom of religion, but the court dismissed his appeal, stating:
The appellant's religious views were, of course, entirely irrelevant. The
question of appellant's motives or intentions in displaying the swastikas
are not admissible to decide whether the matter or activity is offen-
sive .... [W]hether the appellant was motivated by genuine religious be-
lief.., mattered not.
This passage goes to the heart of the question of freedom to prac-
tice one's religion, as distinct from freedom of belief. Unless believ-
ers have some exemptions from legal requirements, their practices
have no more freedom than is accorded other persons. Thus, until a
higher court examines the question, the religious freedom provisions
of the BOR do not offer great promise of protection for sacred sites.
It is more likely that provisions for religious equality will affect sa-
cred site claims. Most claims will be by Maori, and the BOR expressly
recognizes the right of "an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority...
to profess and practise the religion.., of that minority." 6 More gen-erally, BOR section 19(2) expressly allows measures "taken in good
21 Electoral Act, 1993, § 268.
See Mendelssohn v. Centrepoint Cmty. Growth Trust [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 88 (appointing a
public trustee to manage religious trust that had become paralyzed by dissension); Quilter v.
Att'y-Gen. [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (finding Marriage Act in conflict with lesbian couples' equality
claim); Re J (an Infant): B & B v. Dir.-Gen. of Soc. Welfare [1996] 2 N.Z.L.R. 134 (sustaining
medical guardianship of child against parents' religious freedom claims).
23 [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 700.
24 Resource Management Act, 1991, § 322(a)(ii). This part of the statute in effect codifies
the common law of nuisance, and much of the reported judgment sounds in nuisance. Other
parts of the statute are discussed below. See infra notes 30-50 and accompanying text.
25 [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 710. Thejudgment is peculiar because the quoted passage appeared
before the Court turned to the Bill of Rights Act, and discussion of the Act was confined to
freedom of expression, which was recognized as relevant but its limits justified under section 5.
See id. at 710-11.
Bill of Rights Act, 1990, § 20.
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faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of
persons disadvantaged because of discrimination" based on religious
belief. This insulates from attack a number of important measures
that specifically recognize Maori religious concerns, which are in-
voked in preference to the general provisions of the BOR.
2. Political Actions Protecting Maori Sacred Sites
New Zealand has a general program to settle Maori land and
other claims against the Crown through the Waitangi Tribunal, an
administrative court.7 Religious issues have been prominent in a
number of proceedings before the tribunal.2 Tribunal reports re-
quire legislation to implement, but successive governments have
sought to reach accommodations with tribes. Many of these have in-
volved transfer of Crown land to Maori, and some religious sites have
been returned in the process.29
Turning to sites on government and private land, the Resource
Management Act 1991 (RMA) consolidated many land use and plan-
ning laws into a single, complex, and somewhat controversial enact-
ment of more than 400 sections. Pertinently, RMA section 6 added
explicit protection for wahi tapu, Maori sacred sites.3 Statutory rec-
32ognition of wahi tapu is also found in at least seven other statutes.
The term is explicitly defined only in section 2 of the Historic Places
Act 1993 as "a place sacred to Maori in the traditional, spiritual, relig-
ious, ritual, or mythological sense."
27 See Waitangi Tribunal, Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, at http://www.waitangi-
tribunal.govt.nz/faq (last visited Jan. 9, 2003). The Tribunal describes itself as "a permanent
commission of inquiry." Id.
28 See, e.g., Waitangi Tribunal, Te Roroa Claim, at http://www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz
/reports/reports.asp (select "Nort Island - North") (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
29 See, e.g., Pouakani Claims Settlement Act, 2000; Ngati Turangitukua Claims Settlement
Act, 1999; Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act, 1998; Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act,
1995.
.0 See RMA-Net, at http://www.rma.co.nz/frame.html (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
31 In accordance with New Zealand usage, Maori words are not italicized in this article.
Wahi, also spelled waahi, wfhi and wahi (different spellings to show that "a" is a long vowel), is
rendered as site or place in Maori-English dictionaries. Tapu is the Maori cognate of the Tongan
tabu, taken into English as taboo and into many other languages. However, the dictionary ren-
ders tapu as sacred or forbidden, a broader meaning than taboo. See THE REED DICrIONARY OF
MODERN MAORI (P. M. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 1997). The a in Maori is also long, and many sources
spell it Mdori or Mdori. See, e.g., MAORI L. REV. since July 1995. RMA § 42 and Second Schedule
Part II 1 2 also refer to wahi tapu.
s2 See Crown Forest Assets Act, 1989, §§ 18, 22; Biosecurity Act, 1993 §§ 57, 60, 72; Hazardous
Substances & New Organisms Act, 1996, § 6; Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act, 1988,
§ 10 (amending § 27-27D of State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986); Fisheries Act, 1996, § 121;
Overseas Investment Act, 1973, Schedule 1, Part 1; Historic Places Act, 1993, §§ 2, 4-7, 22, 25-30,
32-35, 37, 39, 54, 85, 98, 103, 105, 106.
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Reported decisions involving protection of wahi tapu under these
statutes have mostly involved only RMA section 6(e), which provides:
"[A] 11 persons exercising functions and powers under
[RMA] ... shall recognise and provide for the following matters of
national importance: . . . (e) The relationship of Maori and their
culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi
tapu, and other taonga."
It is clear that "ancestral" in this provision refers to past as well as
present ownership. This point was established in litigation under a
predecessor statute. However, the term further accentuates that the
provision is distinctive to Maori interests because other religious
claimants would usually have no prior ownership interest in a site.
While RMA section 6(e) recognizes wahi tapu, it does so in com-
mon with the Maori relationship with ancestral lands, water, and
"other taonga" (treasures). The religious interest is listed with other
heritage and cultural interests and is worded equally to them. Simi-
larly, the statutory definition in section 2 of the Historic Places Act
lists the Maori religious interest with traditional, ritual, and mytho-
logical interests, albeit modified throughout by "sacred."M Moreover,
section 6(e) is but one part of section 6, which also lists a series of
conservation goals and public access to waterways as other matters of
national importance."
All of RMA section 6 is subordinate to section 5, which states the
Act's purpose to be the sustainable management of resources. How-
ever, insofar as this is a conservation goal, it will often be compatible
with sacred site claims against development.
This structure appears to diminish the relative importance of re-
ligious freedom by equating it to other cultural and environmental
interests. Whether it will actually diminish protection of religious
freedom is not clear from the face of the statute, though it could have
that effect. The very broad interests protected by RMA section6 will
conflict with a correspondingly broad range of competing interests,
and the balancing of interests required by RMA will therefore give a
decisionmaker great opportunities to find section 6 interests to be
outweighed, or, conversely in the present context, to decide that re-
"3 Envtl. Det Soc'y v. Mangonui County Council [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 257 (C.A.) (involving
application to a zoning decision of section 3(1)(g) of the Town & Country Planning Act 1977,
which stated that matters of national importance included the relationship of Maori to their
ancestral land). Section 3(1) required these matters to be "recognised and provided for." Sec-
tion 3 was similar to RMA section 6 but made no particular reference to wahi tapu. The Court's
judgment held that the Planning Tribunal had given insufficient weight to section 3(1) (g) and
to another factor and ordered a rehearing.
M See Historic Places Act, 1993, § 2 ("'Wahi tapu' means a place sacred to Maori in the tradi-
tional, spiritual, religious, ritual, or mythological sense.").
35 Resource Management Act, 1991, § 6.
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ligious interests should outrank others. Officials must "recognise and
provide" for wahi tapu but retain discretion to decide whether com-
peting interests are more important. However, a decision interpret-
ing the weaker requirement of a different statute that an agency "take
into account" wahi tapu reasoned that "[o]ne does not 'provide for' a
factor by considering and then discarding it.' 6
A number of reported judgments addressed Maori sacred site
claims under RMA section 6(e), but all were occasioned by review of
applications for resource consent to development, and most involved
land owned by private parties, state-owned enterprises, or local
authorities. Maori sacred sites on undeveloped Crown land are likely
to be found mostly on land administered by the Department of Con-
servation, which oversees parks, indigenous forests, wilderness areas,
and reserves.3 ' RMA's terms are broad enough for direct claims to sa-
cred sites on such land, but none has yet become the subject of a re-
ported dispute.
Nevertheless, reported judgments offer a good preliminary insight
into the place of RMA section 6(e) in RMA applications. One impor-
tant duty that has clearly emerged is for land planners and develop-
ers, public and private, to notify tangata whenua, the local Maori, of
pending applications for resource consent, followed by a duty to con-
sult.! While these are procedural requirements, they assure Maori
the opportunity to present their substantive claims, including sacred
site claims, and have them considered in the consent process. Plan-
ners and developers have an incentive to consult and to accommo-
date Maori wishes to reduce conflict over their proposals. If a party is
dissatisfied with a decision, judicial review can be had in the Envi-
ronment Court, an institution that bears some resemblance to an
American administrative court. Its judgments can be appealed to the
High Court, comparable in standing to a U.S. District Court, then to
the Court of Appeal.39
Maori religious objections have been raised against many land-
planning decisions since 1991, and decisions have gone for and
against them. Notably, a television tower proposal was defeated, 40 as
was a housing development,41 while many other proposals were ap-
36 Bleakley v. Envtl. Risk Mgmt. Auth. [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 213 (H.C.) 1 72 (interpreting Haz-
ardous Substances and New Organisms Act, 1996, § 6).
37 See Conservation Act, 1987 (establishing Department of Conservation).
38 See Kenneth Palmer, Consultation with the Tangata Whenua Under the Resource Management
Act (1994) 1 B.R.M.B. 21.
39 See Butterworths Laws of New Zealand, Courts 11-18.
40 TV3 Network Services, Ltd. v. Waikato Dist. Council [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 360 (H.C.).
41 Gill v. Rotorua Dist. Council [1993] 2 N.Z.R.M.A. 604 (Planning Tribunal).
Jan. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTFTI'ONAL LAW
proved." A number of Maori sacred site claims concern waterways,
41where Maori ownership claims are also asserted . In contexts not ex-
plicitly religious, two decisions made clear that statutory protections
include values that are metaphysical and intangible but found those
values outweighed 
by others.
The leading decision on Maori sacred sites is Watercare Services,
Ltd. v. Minhinnick.4' Watercare planned to build a major sewer line to
serve Manukau City, the southern part of greater Auckland, with a to-
tal population over one million. The line was to cross an undevel-
oped, rocky shoreline that had once been inhabited by Maori. The
company consulted local Maori leaders about possible religious or
other objections and adjusted the line's route based on the consulta-
tions. A Maori blessing ceremony was held on the site.
Minhinnick and Black were local Maori who disagreed with those
who had approved of the line. They sued in the Environment Court
to stop the project under RMA section 6.46 The court ruled against
them, reasoning that to prevail, religious claims must be based on a
reasonable person's viewpoint, a test that the plaintiffs' claim did not
satisfy. 47 The court also emphasized the environmental importance of
the sewer line. Both reasons implied that the court was weighing
competing interests.
Minhinnick and Black appealed to the High Court, which re-
versed the Environment Court's ruling, stating that the legal test
should be based on the viewpoint of Maori people in particular, rea-
sonable Maori rather than reasonable persons generally. 8  The
judgment said nothing about the importance of the sewer line, sug-
gesting that the court was giving much less weight to competing in-
terests. Watercare appealed to the Court of Appeal, which in turn re-
42 See, e.g., Ngatiwai Trust Bd. v. New Zealand Historic Places Trust [1998] N.Z.R.M.A. 1
(H.C.). See generally, Paul Beverly, The Mechanisms for the Protection of Maori Interests Under Part I
of the Resources Management Act 1991, (1998) 2 N.Z.J. ENV. L. 121 (discussing statutory mecha-
nisms for protecting Maori interests).
43 See Ani Mikaere & Stephanie Milroy, Review: Treaty of Waitangi and Maori Land Law, (2000)
N.Z. L. REV. 363, 381-83. The authors state, "At best, the Resource Management Act causes
councils to consult with Maori, but the cognisance taken of that consultation is, in the eyes of
many Maori, totally inadequate." Id. at 382. See also Butterworths Laws of New Zealand, Maori
Affairs 143 (criticisms by Waitangi Tribunal).
44 Friends & Cmty. of Ngawha Inc. v. Minister of Corrections (H.C., Wellington, AP 110/02,
20 June 2002) (prison site); Bleakley v. Envtl. Risk Mgmt. Auth. [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 213 (H.C.)
(holding that research on genetically modified organisms was justified because the benefits to
be gained from knowledge outweighed other considerations).
45 [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 294 (C.A.).
46 The procedural vehicle was § 314(l)(a) (ii), which authorizes enforcement orders based
on substantive provisions of the statute.
47 Minhinnick v. Watercare Servs., Ltd. [1997] N.Z.R.M.A. 289 (E.C.).
48 Minhinnick v. Watercare Servs., Ltd. [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 63 (H.C.).
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versed, agreeing with the Environment Court.49 The Court of Appeal
also held that the sewer line had been previously approved during
adoption of a district plan and was no longer subject to review. The
objectors could have sued then to overturn the plan, but could not
sue now.
Minhinnick illustrates several important issues about religious
freedom claims. It is a clear case of important competing interests
balanced against a religious claim that seems to an outsider to be of
marginal importance to religious exercise. It poses the problem of
the interests of individual believers or dissenters versus those of an
organized group. And it poses the problem of the standard by which
to judge a religious claim in relation to adherents versus outsiders.
The debate about whether the viewpoint should be reasonable per-
sons or reasonable Maori was a step removed from the underlying
question of irreconcilable viewpoints of believers and other persons.
But of course any limit to the views of a reasonable person implies
some factoring in of competing interests, and there is an inherent
tension between lawyers' definitions of reasonableness and religious
faith in things that cannot be proved.
B. Australia
Australia's Aboriginal peoples settled the continent an estimated
50,000-60,000 years ago, and they spread across the vast territory in
separate societies isolated from one another. 5' Traditional Aboriginal
religious practices are closely tied to natural places and things. Ef-
forts were made to convert Aboriginals to Christianity, but traditional
faiths survived, both in concert with and apart from Christian wor-
ship.52
Australia has a federal system under a written Constitution and
the institution of constitutional judicial review, but no general bill of
49 Watercare Servs., Ltd. v. Minhinnick [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 294, 307.
50 The issue was explicitly recognized in Mangakahia Maori Komiti v. Northland Reg'l
Council [1996] N.Z.R.M.A. 193, 216 (E.C.) (stating that the decision was "based on the weigh-
ing of considerations that may, in effect, be irreconcilable").
51 See Australian Indigenous Population, History, at http://www.koori.iisds.com/history.htm
(last visitedJan. 2003) (summarizing early Aboriginal history).
52 See Adherents.com, Religion in Australia, at http://www.adherents.com/loc/loc-australia
.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (listing religious data from the 1996 census); Yuri Koszarycz, Re-
ligion in Aboriginal Australia, at http://www.mcauley.acu.edu.au/~yuri/readings/charesworth
.hun (last visited Jan. 2003) (quoting Max Charlesworth, Introduction, in RELIGION IN
ABORIGINAL AUSTRLIA: AN ANTHOLOGY (Max Charlesworth et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992) (reviewing
the history of Western attitudes and understanding about Aboriginal religion)).
Jan. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
rights. 53  An exception is the Constitution's provision on religion,
which resembles the American First Amendment: "Commonwealth
not to legislate in respect of religion. The Commonwealth shall not
make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any relig
ious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion."
However, this provision appears in the constitutional article titled
"The States," and its primary function is a federalism provision, an al-
location of power to the states rather than the Commonwealth (na-
tional) government. It is an individual rights guarantee only against
the national government. 55 Hence, national protection of religious
interests depends on statutes and other political acts rather than the
Constitution. At the state level, only Tasmania has a bill of rights,
and it is not entrenched.5 However, in recent years Australian gov-
ernments have taken a number of legislative steps to accommodate
and protect Aboriginal religious and cultural interests. The historical
record, however, is another matter. 7 One event of great importance,
though outside the direct concern of this article, is recent legal rec-
ognition of Aboriginal land title.5
The first pertinent statute was the Western Australia Aboriginal
Heritage Act 1972. Its scope is broader than religion but confined to
Aboriginal concerns. It was followed by the national Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) (hereinaf-
ter Heritage Protection Act 1984). By protecting Aboriginal heritage,
this enactment skirts the constitutional religion clause, relying on the
constitutional provision according the Commonwealth government's
power over Aboriginal issues.60 The South Australia Aboriginal Heri-
tage Act 1988 is similar to Western Australia's. 61 The following year,
53 See R.D. LUMB & G.A. MOENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
ANNOTATED 11 33-37, 352, at 27-33, 229-230 (5th ed. 1995) (describing the Australian judicial
system under the Constitution).
54 AUSTL. CONST. ch. V, The States, § 116.
55 See LUMB & MOENS, supra note 53, 11 739-744, at 531 (noting the strictly federal scope of
the guarantee). There is a good argument that the original purpose of the First Amendment's
religion clauses was the same. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 26-27 (1999) (defending a federalist view of
the First Amendment).
56 See R.D. LUMB, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN STATES 108 n.116 (2d ed. 1965)
(describing freedom of religion in the Tasmanian Constitution Act).57 See HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND (1987).
58 See PETER BUrr Er AL, MABO, WIK & NATIVE TITLE 8-9 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing Mabo
and Wik decisions of the High Court).
See Aboriginal Heritage Act, 1972 (W.A.), at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa
/consol-act/aha1972164 (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (allowing for the preservation of places and
objects of general importance to Aboriginals).
See LUMB & MOENS, supra note 53, at 335-36, at 216-19 (describing federal power to
legislate on the basis of race).
61 See Aboriginal Heritage Act, 1988 (S.A.), at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol
_act/aha1988164/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) ("for the protection and preservation of
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the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 became the
first statute to address religion specifically.62
The Australian government has also assisted Aboriginal tribes in
reacquiring ownership of sacred sites. Most prominent was convey-
ance to the local tribe of the dramatic site commonly known as Ayers
Rock, or Uluru to its Aboriginal owners. This was done pursuant to a
complex agreement that commits management of the site to a trust
board that has both Aboriginal and other members.63 The site is a
world-class tourist attraction, and many tourists want to climb the
rock. This is considered wrong by the local tribe, but tribal income
depends on tourists. The tribe decided to post signs that request visi-
tors not to climb out of respect for Aboriginal religion, but climbing
is nonetheless allowed for those who disregard the request. The tribe
has explained that this makes respect for their religion a voluntary,
and thus more meaningful, act.64 Another complex series of disputes
concerns mining in Aboriginal territory or affecting sacred sites.
Compromises have been reached that do not satisfy advocates for ei-
ther side.63
Several disputes about Aboriginal sacred and other cultural sites
have reached the Australian courts. Easily the most significant is that
involving Hindmarsh Island in South Australia. The island is in a re-
sort area south of Adelaide, a city of about one million. The island
had been accessible only by ferries. The Chapman family, resort
owners and developers, proposed to build a bridge to connect the is-
land to the mainland. When they ran into financial difficulty, the
South Australian government undertook to pay for part of the proj-
ect .6
A group of Aboriginal women from the local Ngarrindjerri Tribe
protested on religious grounds, invoking the Heritage Protection Act
the Aboriginal heritage"); Aboriginal Heritage Act, 1972 (W.A.), supra note 59 ("for the preser-
vation ... of places and objects... used by or traditional to the original inhabitants of Austra-
lia").
See Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act, 1989, at http://www.austlii.edu.au
/au/legis/nt/consol-act/ntassa453 (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
See ROBERT LAYTON, ULURU: AN ABORIGINAL HISTORY OF AYERS ROCK 105-119 (2001) (de-
scribing history of Uluru land claim); Australian Parks and Reserves, Ulurn-Kata Tjuta National
Park, at http://www.ea.gov.au/parks/uluru (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (official web site for
Uluru).
See Australian Parks and Reserves, Ulurn-Kata Tjuta National Park, Please Don't Climb Uluru,
at http://www.ea.gov.au/parks/uluru/no-climb/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (exhort-
ing visitors to choose not to climb Uluru).
66 See Andrew McWilliam, Negotiating Desecration: Sacred Sites Damage and Due Compensation in
the Northern Territory, in 1 AUSTL. ABORIGINAL STUD. 2 (1998); KEN GELDER & JANE M. JACOBS,
UNCANNY AUSTRALIA: SACREDNESS AND IDENTIIY IN A POSTCOLONIAL NATION 17, 52 (1998) (de-
scribing disputes between mining interests and Aboriginals).
See Neil Andrews, Dissenting in Paradise?: The Hindmarsh Island Bridge Royal Commission,
(1998) 5 CANBERRA L. REV. 5, 16 n.49 (describing events stated in the text).
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1984. When the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal Affairs at-
tempted to commission a report, the Aboriginal women said that de-
tails of the island's sacred character could not be revealed to men. So
the (male) Minister appointed a woman, Professor Cheryl Saunders
of Melbourne University, to make the report. Her report found the
women's claim to be genuine and important but did not reveal de-
tails to the Minister out of respect for the women's view that men
should not be told. A sealed part of the report relating these details
was reviewed by a female member of the Minister's staff. '
Based on the report, the Minister issued an order under the Heri-
tage Protection Act 1984 to forbid construction of the bridge for 25
years. The relevant statutory text is:
§ 10 (1) Where the Minister:
(a) receives an application made orally or in writing by or on behalf of an
Aboriginal or a group of Aboriginals seeking the preservation or protec-
tion of a specified area from injury or desecration;
(b) is satisfied:
(i) that the area is a significant Aboriginal area; and
(ii) that it is under threat of injury or desecration;
(c) has received a report under subsection (4) in relation to the area
from a person nominated by him or her and has considered the report
and any representations attached to the report; and
(d) has considered such other matters as he or she thinks relevant; he or
she may make a declaration in relation to the area.
§ 11 A declaration under subsection 10(1) in relation to an area shall:
(a) describe the area with sufficient particulars to enable the area to be
identified; and
(b) contain provisions for and in relation to the protection and preserva-
tion of the area from injury or desecration.
The Chapmans sought review in federal court, which overturned the
order because the Minister did not have the facts before him when
making the order. 8 Meanwhile, the South Australian government
convened a Royal Commission to investigate the genuineness of the
women's religious claim, and the resulting Commission report
branded the claim to be a "fabrication." 69
The Commonwealth minister began the process of reexamining
the women's claim on remand from the federal court, appointing a
67 Id. at 11.
68 Tickner v. Chapman, 57 F.C.R. 451; 133 A.L.R.. 226 (1995); 1995 WL 1691084.
W See Andrews, supra note 66, at 20. See also Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement v. State of
South Australia I [1995] 64 S.A.S.R. 551 (sustaining Commission's validity).
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female judge as the new reporter. 70 However, Parliament preempted
the question by amending the Heritage Protection Act 1984 to ex-
empt the bridge project. The South Australian Royal Commission's
report probably played a role in the amendment's enactment.7 1 In
relevant part, the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth) states:
"The Heritage Protection Act does not authorise the making of a dec-
laration in relation to the preservation or protection of an area or ob-
ject from. . . the construction of a bridge, and associated works (in-
cludin approaches to the bridge), in the Hindmarsh Island bridge
area. On judicial review, the High Court of Australia, the nation's• • • 73
highest court, sustained the amendment's validity. In due course
the bridge was built and opened in March 2002.74
The Hindmarsh dispute centered on two problems that have
arisen in a number of sacred site disputes. One is the question of
confidentiality.75 The other is the problem of civil courts or other tri-
bunals evaluating the sincerity and importance of religious claims.76
The case also shows the problems that arise when religious issues are
addressed in a vague statute that provides no guidance about stan-
dards for assessing claims. The dispute has been prominent, generat-
ing book-length dissents from the outcome, but most dwell on his-
torical injustices to Aboriginal people rather than on how sacred site
claims ought to be evaluated.77
C. The United States
Native American adherents of traditional religions have had nota-
ble political successes in modern times. Some very significant sacred
sites have been returned to tribal ownership, and several statutes
70 See Wilson v. Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, [1996] 189 C.L.R.
1; 138 A.L.R. 220; 1996 WL 1747209 (Austl.) (reviewing validity of the appointment).
71 See Andrews, supra note 66, at 12-14 (describing political effects of the report).
72 A later chapter in the tale was the failure of the Chapmans' suit against Professor Saun-
ders and the Commonwealth to recover attorneys fees and other costs of suit. See Chapman v
Luminis, [2001] F.C.A. 1106; 2001 WL 985712 (appeal pending; see http://www.fedcourt.gov.au
/courtlists/lists.appeal.html) (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
73 Kartinyeri v. Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337; 152 ALR 540; 1998 WL 1672663
(Austl.).
74 See The Marina Hindmarsh Island, Latest News, at http://www.murray-river.net/boating
/marina-hindmarsh-island/news.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (stating that bridge officially
opened in March 2001).
75 See, e.g., ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL
TRADITIONS 116-17 (2000) (discussing confidentiality).
76 See infra notes 132-51 and accompanying text.
7n See, e.g., HANNAH RACHEL BELL, MEN'S BUSINESS, WOMEN'S BUSINESS: THE SPIRITUAL ROLE
OF GENDER IN THE WORLD'S OLDEST CULTURE (1996).
78 See GULLIFORD, supra note 75, at 99-176 (identifying sacred sites that have been returned
to tribal ownership).
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and an executive order protect a range of Indian religious interests.
The most general is the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of
1996 (AIRFA), which provides,
Henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and pre-
serve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe,
express, and exercise [their] traditional religions .... including but not
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred object and the
freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites."
The enactment did not create a judicially enforceable cause of ac-
tion,80 but it has had an effect on Executive Department policy. Im-
portant evidence of this is Executive Order 13007, protecting Indian
sacred sites on federal land.8 ' Another statute of significance is the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, protecting
Indian religious interests in funerary and ceremonial objects and cre-
ating legal interests in their recovery.82 The Peyote Sacrament Act of83
1996 protects Indian religious use of peyote; it is duplicated in the
laws of a number of states.
A less visible development is the policies engendered by the Na-
tional Environmental Policy ActOs and by the general trend toward
816management plans for public agencies. These have led to programs
to adopt systematic plans for national parks, monuments, forests, and
other federal holdings. When a plan is prepared, both the general
breadth of plans and the policies of AIRFA and the Executive Order
protecting sacred sites generate federally funded examinations of Na-
tive American religious interests in government lands. They also
generate accommodations to religious uses at the administrative
level. Two of these plans were involved in prominent lawsuits de-
scribed below, but many others have both created records of Indian
religious interests and resulted in accommodations of them.
A currently important political issue concerns national parks and
monuments. A longstanding administrative rule bans taking any-
thing-animal, vegetable or mineral-from park land. The rule has
79 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2000).
so See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455 (1988) ("No-
where in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any judi-
cially enforceable individual rights.").
srExec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
82 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000). See Symposium, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act of 1990 and State Repatriation-Related Legislation, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1992).
83 42 U.S.C § 1996a(b)(1) (2000).
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 37-2732A (Michie 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.541 (2001); TEX.
HEALTH& SAFETYCODEANN. § 481.111 (Vernon 1992).
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4335 (2000).
86 See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo.
1998), affld, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000) (describing Na-
tional Park Service plan for managing rock climbing at sacred sites).
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an exception for scientific work, but it specifically negates religious
exceptions. 7 Over the past few years, proposals have been floated in
the Interior Department to amend the rule to allow exceptions for
Indian religious needs.88 A prominent and controversial religious
claim is that of Hopi religious adherents, who wish to gather baby ea-
gles from nests on Wupatki National Monument. 9
Most advocates for Native American sacred sites and other relig-
ious interests would characterize the paragraphs above as overly posi-
tive. There have been many failures of golitical action, and inevitably
many claims have been compromised. In American popular con-
sciousness, however, political action is small potatoes. Constitutional
litigation and Supreme Court pronouncements are what matters.
From this perspective, Native American religious freedom appears to
have fared badly. Two losses in the Supreme Court are well known.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,9' the Court re-
jected Indians' free exercise attack on a Forest Service plan to pave a
logging road through the Chimney Rock area in northwestern Cali-
fornia, traditionally used for Native religious exercises. Two years
later, in Employment Division v. Smith,92 the Court sustained Oregon's
ban on peyote applied to members of the Native American Church,
for whom the plant is a sacrament. Moreover, the Court took the oc-
casion to weaken its test to govern the Free Exercise Clause, appar-
ently making it more difficult for all religions to gain protection for
religious freedom.9
Things fared little better in the lower courts. The California Su-
preme Court sustained constitutional liberty for the Native American
Church, 94 but the decision was eclipsed by Employment Division v.
87 36 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2001) (provision "shall not be construed as authorizing the taking, use, or
possession ... for ceremonial or religious purposes").
88 See National Park Service Management Policies, ch. 1, § 4 (2001), available at http://www.
nps.gov/policy/mp/chapterl.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (allowing the "NPS decisionmaker"
to decide on a case-by-case basis when something may be removed from a national park or
monument).
89 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, The National Park Service Issues a Proposed
Rule Regarding the Hopi Collection of Golden Eaglets from Wupatki National Monument
(Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.nps.gov/wupa/pppressreleases/acf34d.htm (last visited
Jan. 9, 2003) (announcing proposed rule to allow gathering of eaglets for religious purposes).
90 See, e.g., GULLIFORD, supra note 75, at 99-176 (discussing political action taken to obtain
ownership of sacred sites and the success of such efforts); Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Illusion of
Religious Freedom for Indigenous Americans, 65 OR L. REV. 363 (1986) (arguing that the legal sys-
tem does not protect Native Americans' religious freedom).
91 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
92 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
93 Id. at 879.
94 People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
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Smith. Most other constitutional religious liberty claims by Native
Americans have failed over the years.5 -
The courts undercut Indian religious freedom from another di-
rection in a case involving Devil's Tower National Monument.9 The
tower has been an important site for traditional religions of several
tribes since time immemorial. As part of a management plan for the
monument, the Park Service gathered comprehensive and powerful
evidence of Indians' religious interests in the site. However, in recent
years the monument has become a world-class destination for rock
climbers. Religious adherents objected to climbers defacing the
monument and sought its closure to climbing. The Park Service
adopted a compromise. It banned commercial climbing during the
month ofJune because the summer solstice and surrounding days are
the most significant times for the faithful. The Service also estab-
lished a system of informing individual climbers about the Indians'
religious objections and asking them to refrain from climbing in97...
June. The tribes, for reasons similar to those of the Aboriginal own-
ers of Ayers Rock/Uluru in Australia, 98 accepted the rules. But a
group of commercial climbing guides sued, alleging that the rules
were religious favoritism in violation of the Establishment Clause. A
federal district judge agreed with respect to the June commercial clo-
sure, which was enjoined.9 Rather than appeal, the Park Service
withdrew the commercial closure rule. The guides' attack on the
program of asking climbers to respect Indian objections failed, and
that aspect of the program remains in force.'O"
Negative outcomes in these prominent lawsuits mask positive as-
pects of the losing cases themselves. The Forest Service's planning
95 See, e.g, Conservation Law Found. v. FERC, 216 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission did not have to preserve water flows for canoes to reach
sacred site when relicensing a project); Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983) (sustaining approval to build private ski area on sacred mountain);
Attakai v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990) (allowing range restoration plan af-
fecting sacred sites); Crow v. Gullett, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D. S.D. 1982) (ceremonial use of state
park); Sequoyah Valley v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (flooding
of sacred sites for reservoir); Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977) (allowing
damage of sacred sites at Rainbow Bridge National Monument).
See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998).
97 See U.S. Department of the Interior National Park Service Rocky Mountain Region, Final
Climbing Management Plan, avilable at http://www.nps.gov/deto/detoclimbing/detosumm
.html (Feb. 1995). The Park Service plan also limited the placing of new climbing aids in the
walls of Devil's Tower. Id.
98 See Australian Parks and Reserves, supra note 64 (explaining that a voluntary ban on
climbing was more appropriate for Australian Aboriginals because it made climbers' respect for
Aboriginal religion more meaningful).
99 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 1996 (unreported opinion), quoted inJUDITHV.
ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 30 (2002).
100 See id.
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process in Northwest Indian Cemetery produced a thorough and sympa-
thetic chronicle of Indian religious interests in the Chimney Rock
area, information that led to significant efforts to minimize the im-
pact on religious uses, and the delay generated by the lawsuit was
enough to scuttle the road politically. Before the case ended, Chim-
ney Rock became part of a wilderness area.' The outcome of Em-
ployment Division v. Smith led to enactment of the Peyote Sacrament
Act.' 02 The Supreme Court's change of constitutional standard in the
case also led to enactment of federal and state religious freedom res-
toration acts (RFRAs), which attempt to revive the legal test jetti-
soned by the Court and arguably expanded it.'1° The 1993 federal
RFRA was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as applied to
state governments. 1°4 But it continues in force as applied to the fed-
eral government, and internal federal policy is to comply with the
Act.' °5 Because Native American sacred sites are more often on fed-
eral land, the statute as truncated by the Court is more important to
Indian religions than others.
Both RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause have been invoked by
Indians prosecuted for killing animals protected by federal environ-
mental laws. The most prominent statute is the Eagle Protection Act,
which bans killing eagles or possessing or selling eagle parts."' How-
ever, eagle feathers are important to many Indian religions, as well as
culturally important to a still larger Native American population.
The statute has a limited exception for Indian religious uses, but it
does not satisfy demands within Native America. As a result, there
have been a significant number of federal prosecutions of Indians
under the Act, and these in turn have generated religious freedom
defenses. Some have been rejected on the ground that the defen-
dant did not appear to have a sincere religious interest at stake. °7
101 See Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 442-45 (1988).
102 42 U.S.C § 1996a(b)(1) (2000). See also Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1994, 140
CONG. REC. 7,155 (1994).
103 The federal statute is 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000). Nine states have enacted similar stat-
utes, and Alabama has adopted a constitutional amendment. See ALA. CONST. amend. 622, and
statutes, at http://www.religious-freedom.org/rflawal.html (on file with author).
104 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that RFRA as applied to state gov-
ernment was an unconstitutional extension of federal power).
105 See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the unconstitutional sec-
tions of RFRA severable and the act constitutional as applied to the federal government);
Young v. Crystal Evangelical Church, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding RFRA constitu-
tional pursuant to the "Bankruptcy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I of
the Constitution").
106 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668a (2000).
107 See United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that defendant's sale
of birds negated defense that birds were taken for religious purposes); United States v. Hugs,
109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding burdens on Native American religion imposed by the
Eagle Protection Act were warranted as the Act served a compelling government interest).
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Recently, the Tenth Circuit held that non-Indians have a RFRA claim
to share in the exception unless the Government can justify preferen-
tial treatment of Indians.'
D. Canada
The most spectacular political success of an indigenous group has
to be Canada's establishment of Nunavut, a vast northern territory
governed by its Inuit inhabitants based on an agreement with the
Crown enacted as a statute.' °9 Other First Nations in Canada have
also made important gains in land ownership,1 and a number of law-
suits involve land claims.' When land is indigenously controlled, re-
ligious questions are an internal matter for tribal owners.
Canada and Canadian provinces have no legislation directly con-
cerned with sacred sites on Crown lands. A number of enactments
provide for protection of heritage sites,' 2 but to date no reported
108 United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that exceptions to
the Eagle Protection Act could not be limited to members of federally recognized tribes, unless
the government could show that limit was the least restrictive means of advancing the govern-
ment's compelling interest).
109 Nunavut Settlement Act ofJune 10, 1993, ch. 28., 1993 S.C. 1191 (Can.); see also Informa-
tion Gateway to Nunavut, http://www.nunavut.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (discussing what
has occurred under the Nunavut Settlement Act).
n1o See, e.g., Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act of July 7, 1994, ch. 34, 1994 S.C.
(Can.) (validating land claim agreements in the Yukon Territory), at http://www.laws.justice
.gc.ca/en/Y.2.3 (last visited Jan. 9, 2003); Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act of March
15, 1986, ch. 27, 1986 S.C. 941 (Can.) (enabling the Sechelt Indians to "exercise and maintain
self-government on Sechelt lands"); Cree-Naskapi Act of June 14, 1984, ch. 18, 1984 S.C. 425
(Can.), at http://aws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-45.7/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (providing for a local
"Cree and Naskapi local government, for the administration, management, and control
of... land"); James Bay and Northern Quebec Claims Settlement Act of July 14, 1977, ch. 32,
1975 S.C. 879 (Can.), at http://www.canlii.org/qc/sta/c67/whole.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2003) (establishing a territory for the Crees and Inuit); Nisga'a Final Agreement Act of April 26,
1999, ch. 32, 1999 S.B.C. (B.C.) (establishing Nisga'a land ownership); Act Approving the
Agreement Concerning James Bay and Northern Quebec of June 9, 1976, ch. 46, 1976 SQ.
(Que.) (accepting the agreement between Crees, Inuit, and Quebec for the purchase of land),
at http://www.canlii.org/gc/sta/c67/whole.html (last visitedJan. 9, 2003); Delgamuukw v. Brit-
ish Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
I See, e.g., Xeni Gwet'in First Nations v. British Columbia, [2002] B.C.C.A. 434 (C.A. Br.
Col.) (authorizing land claim to proceed); Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada, [2000] 195
D.L.R. (4th) 135 (C.A. Ontario 2001) (denying Indian band's land claim to much of City of
Sarnia); Squamish Indian Band v. Canada, [2000 100 A.C.W.S. (3d) 520, 2000 A.C.W.S. LEXIS
48082 (Fed. Ct.) (denying Indian bands' claim to government land); Poplar Point Ojibway Na-
tion v. Ontario, [1993] 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) 232, 1993 A.C.W.S. LEXIS 32873 (Ontario Div. Ct.)
(dismissing claim that burial sites should include waterfall and surrounding valley).
11 See Parks Canada Agency Act of Dec. 3, 1998, ch. 31, § 6, 1998 S.C. 5 (Can.) (establishing
agency responsible for protected heritage areas); Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act
of June 18, 1998, ch. 25 § 64(1), 1998 S.C. 22 (Can.) (requiring government to seek and con-
sider advice of First Nations regarding heritage resources before using land or water); Dep't of
Canadian Heritage Act of June 15, 1995, ch. 11 § 4, 1995 S.C. 1-2 (Can.) (authorizing minister
to protect "areas of natural or historical significance").
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dispute has invoked one of these statutes to assert a religious claim
regarding government land. At least one First Nations treaty ex-
pressly protects religious rights, and the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (hereinafter "the Charter") gives constitutional recog-
nition to indigenous treaty rights.
113
But no reported religious rights claim has been made under this
or another treaty clause.
The Charter's text provides grounds to assert constitutional relig-
ious freedom claims. "Freedom of conscience and religion" are en-
trenched as "fundamental freedoms." 14 The Charter's guarantee of
constitutional equality bans discrimination based on religion, and af-
firmative action is expressly allowed.115 No reported judgments in-
volve any significant religious claim by a First Canadian. However,
the text equates religious interests with matters of conscience, and
equality bans can be deployed against religious accommodations.
Application of these provisions in other cases suggests that they will
not be important to Native religious interests. Canada's Supreme
Court has ordered accommodations in limited circumstances., But
in most reported decisions, religious claims have lost out to compet-
ing interests. Some losses occurred under the justification provision
of Charter section 1, others by finding possible accommodations of
religion to be forbidden preferences under section 15."7
E. International Law
Adherents of indigenous religions can invoke several provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966. ll8 Relevant
provisions are similar to those of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990, which was adapted from the international standards. 9 ICCPR
article 18 guarantees religious freedom, article 27 provides that relig-
13 See Regina v. Sioui, [1990] 70 D.L.R. (4th) 427 (finding treaty right to cut trees and light
fires in otherwise restricted areas).
114 Constitution Act, R.S.C., app. B, schedule B (1982) (Can.) ("Everyone has the following
fundamental freedoms: (a) freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief,
opinion and expression.").
15 Id. at § 15.
116 See Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta, [1990] 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417 (ordering employer
to accommodate religious holiday).
117 See David M. Brown, Freedom from or Freedom For?: Religion as a Case Study in Defining the Con-
tent of Charter Rights, (2000) 33 U.B.C. L. REV. 551 (concluding that post-Charter Canadian court
decisions increasingly regard religion as a private, not a public, concern); John Von Heyking,
The Harmonization of Heaven and Earth?: Religion, Politics, and Law in Canada, (2000) 33 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 663, 676-95 (arguing that courts' concentration on secularization is misguided).
118 See G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1976), at http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
119 See Rishworth, supra note 16.
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ious minorities "shall not be denied" the right to practice their reli -
ion, and articles 2 and 4 forbid discrimination based on religion.
ICCPR established the U. N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), a
court-like body whose members are appointed by vote of member
states. HRC hears claims brought by individuals who have exhausted
state remedies, but only when the state against which a claim is made
consents to its jurisdiction.
1 2 '
The four nations considered here have agreed to ICCPR.1 22 The
United States has not agreed to its optional protocol allowing indi-
viduals to bring claims against member states, and American courts
have not entertained ICCPR claims. 12  However, New Zealand, Aus-
tralia and Canada have signed the optional protocol. 25 As a result,
decisions of the Human Rights Committee and of national courts re-
view claims made under ICCPR provisions.1 26 However, no published
decision has been found that reviews a religious rights claim of the
sort considered in this paper against one of these nations.
III. CONFLICTS, COSTS, AND EQUALITY
A. Judicial and Political Accommodations
Much popular rhetoric about religious freedom is carried on in
absolutes. Americans opposed to accommodating religious practices
invoke Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor and carry it to its
logical extreme: no tax exemptions, or subsidies, or public displays or
20 G.A. Res. 2200A, supra note 118.
121 See Ian Malkin, Establishing Supervised Injecting Facilities: A Responsible Way To Help Minimise
Harm, (2001) 25 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 680, 712-13.
1 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, T.S. No. 1057, 407,
at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/partboo/ivboo/iv_4.html (last vis-
itedJan. 9, 2003).
123 See Ballentine v. United States, No. Civ. 1999-130, 2001 WL 1242571, at 13 n.23 (D. V. I.
2001); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, March, 23,
1976, T.S. No. 999, 171, at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/partboo
/iv-boo/iv_5.html (last visitedJan. 9, 2003).
124 See, e.g., Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that
ICCPR neither establishes privately enforceable rights under U.S. law nor overrides constitu-
tional limitations).
195 See Optional Protocol, supra note 123.
12 SeeJ. S. Davidson, Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human Rights
Committee, (2001) N.Z. L. REV. 125, 127-28 (stating that "decisions of the HRC have great moral
authority"); Gerald P. Heckman, Unfinished Business: Baker and the Constitutionality of the Leave
and Certification Requirements Under the Immigration Act, (2002) 27 QUEEN'S L. J. 683, 705-06;
Gillian Triggs, Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law: Validity of the Native Title
Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) (1999) 23 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 372, 375 (arguing that interna-
tional human rights decisions are not binding but are a "crucial guide for legal decisions").
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prayers, and so on. 12 On their side, religious adherents often argue
either as though accommodations impose no costs on others, or that
all such costs are compelled. In the context of Native American relig-
ions, opponents of accommodation have argued favoritism,'12 and
proponents have claimed that any defeat shows the "failure" of legal
protections.2 Both positions ignore the nature of the issue. Making
no accommodations would heavily disadvantage religion by banning
it absolutely from public life, privileging alternative forms of self-
expression and community. 1o Failure to consider costs of accommo-
dation places a legal system on a slippery slope to protecting religious
practices that no society can tolerate, such as those involving physical
harm to persons. Accommodation ought to be made when there are
truly no costs to others, but this is rare"' and is readily achieved in
most instances under current laws and politics of the four nations.
The jurisprudence of religious freedom recognizes that govern-
ments' religious accommodations often impose costs on other per-
sons. 32 Accordingly, a general issue is how to weigh the need for a re-
ligious accommodation against the costs that its recognition would
entail for others. The issue was reflected in the form of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's rule for applying the Free Exercise Clause between
1963 and 1990. According to that test, governmental action that sig-
nificantly burdened religious freedom had to be justified by a "com-
pelling" state interest."' A version of the test endures in federal and
state religious freedom restoration statutes.'m Although phrased as a
governmental interest, costs imposed by religious accommodations
fall on other persons, not solely on a disembodied government.
35
Some costs are spread broadly through the tax system, others fall on
discrete interests, but all costs fall on someone.
A less focused form of the issue appears in New Zealand's Re-
source Management Act 1991, which establishes Maori religious and
cultural issues as "matters of national importance" in a statute that
identifies other significant concerns to be weighed against Maori in-
12 See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Foundation, http://www.ffrf.org/ (last visited Jan. 9,
2003).
12 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998).
12 See, e.g., GULLIFORD, supra note 75, at 101-02 (detailing alleged failure of legislation aimed
at protecting Native American religions).
See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. ClI. L. REV.
1109, 1141-49 (1990).
131 See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465,
1479-80 (1999).
132 See id.
1 SeeJOHN E. NOWAK& RONALD D. ROTUrNDA, CONSTTrnONAL LAW §§ 17.6, 17.8 (6th ed.
2000).
134 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
13 See Volokh, supra note 131, at 1479-80.
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terests.1% On judicial review, the courts have posed the accommoda-
tion issue in terms of reasonableness,'37 which some have criticized as
an inherently secular perspective.'
The Australian Commonwealth statute protecting Aboriginal heri-
tage is yet less exact, authorizing a protective order when the minister
finds a threat to an Aboriginal interest and "has considered such
other matters as he or she thinks relevant." 39 As stated above, Cana-
dian judgments interpreting the Charter have tended to find relig-
ious claims outweighed by competing interests. 14°
Comparing and weighing religious and secular interests, and in-
terests of different religions, is readily addressed in the ordinary po-
litical process, which regularly must decide among competing inter-
ests of every sort. That process of course favors dominant religions.
By contrast, making a juridical issue out of religious freedom is
daunting because of the traditions of judicial role and reasoning.
Substantively, it seems to require judicial evaluation of the impor-
tance of religious claims and comparing incomparables. Proce-
durally, it requires vesting the decision in judges who must necessarily
be either adherents of the faith or outsiders to it, and matters of faith
are surely among the most severe tests ofjudicial impartiality.
Judges are well suited to identify the costs a religious accommoda-
tion imposes on other persons, and American judges have often done
this both in evaluating claims of religious freedom and in deciding
when a political accommodation constitutes an invalid preference or
"establishment." But weighing competing values has led to many dif-
ficulties and to widespread and continuing dissatisfaction with relig-
ion clauses jurisprudence.14 1 In Free Exercise cases, evaluation of the
religious interest is the most elusive question. American judges un-
dertook to decide whether a religious claim was sincere, but claims
that a religious interest was substantially burdened were, as a formal
matter, accepted uncritically.14  Even the sincerity issue was treated
gingerly, and once it was established, the opinions made the entire
process appear to depend on evaluation of the "governmental inter-
est." Yet most claimants lost. In opinion after opinion, the Court re-
cited allegedly dire consequences to a religious interest but found it
I5% See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
18 See Von Heyking, supra note 117, at 682 (discussing "reasonable limits" under Canadian
Charter § 1).
139 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
140 See supra note 117 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 116; Central Al-
berta Dairy Pool v. Alberta, [1990] 72 D.L.R. (4th) 417.
141 See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1999).
142 See NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 133, § 17.6 at 1380-81.
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outweighed by a competing interest. 1 3 In the context of Native sa-
cred sites, the Court accepted that Native Americans' religious inter-
est in the Chimney Rock area was so important that its degradation
could be "devastating" to the faith, yet found the interest out-
weighed.i 4 It is hard to escape the suspicion that the justices were
evaluating the religious interest more critically than they admitted.
On the other hand, their openly sitting in formal judgment on the
importance of a religious claim would be worse.
These difficulties contributed to the Supreme Court's abandon-
ment of the compelling interest test for Free Exercise cases in Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.145 The Court's opinion said it is "horrible to
contemplate" comparing the significance of a religious practice with
the importance of a public law, 46 and inquiry into the importance of
a religious practice would be beyond any "principle of law 
or logic." 47
That was in the context of the unique finality of the Court's judg-
ments, nearly impossible to modify by political means. Judicial ac-
commodations in New Zealand and Australia can be adjusted by or-
dinary legislative means, and Canada's by the Charter's special
provision for legislative override,'4' easing the consequences of an er-
ror in judgment. The RFRA statutes generated by Employment Division
are, like their New Zealand and Australian counterparts, subject to
political review.' 49
Judges under statutory regimes face the same problems of com-
paring religious accommodation needs with costs they impose on
other persons, and they have the same reluctance to evaluate relig-
ious claims as under regimes of judicial finality. However, it is con-
ceivable that the availability of legislative override makes judges less
wary of evaluating religious claims and more willing to order accom-
modations than under regimes of constitutional finality.15° Moreover,
when statutory protections achieve judicial recognition, they have the
very important effect of shifting the burden of obtaining legislative
143 See Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 756 (1992)
(discussing accommodation cases); McConnell, supra note 130, at 1110 (labeling the free exer-
cise compelling interest test "a Potemkin doctrine").
M Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988).
145 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
W Id. at 889-90 n.5.
147 Id. at 887.
148 Constitution Act, supra note 114, § 33 (allowing overrides by ordinary legislation for re-
newable periods of five years, but overrides have been rare because Charter judgments provide
opponents with powerful political arguments). See also PETER W. HOGG, 2 CONSTrIUIONAL
LAWOF CANADA 36-8 to 36-11 (Loose-leafed. 1997).
149 See supra notes 16-19, 55-56 and accompanying text.
150 See Volokh, supra note 131, at 1487-90.
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action from religious adherents to objectors, an effect of great signifi-
cance to faiths with small memberships."'
B. Equality
The Employment Division Court substituted a Free Exercise test that
allows courts to overturn statutes only when the "object" of the law is
to prohibit free exercise."' A later case described this as a prohibi-
tion on discrimination against a religious practice.15 New Zealand,
Australia and Canada also have explicit protections against religious
discrimination, " and employment discrimination statutes often ban
religious discrimination./5 This may seem a more judicially manage-
able standard, as courts regularly deal with discrimination claims.
However, these are straightforward only when religious claimants
seek the same treatment as others (such as protection against exclu-
sion from employment because of religion, according all religions
like tax exemptions, and requiring that religious groups have use of
public facilities equally with similar secular groups). Claims that re-
ligious equality requires accommodation pose unique conceptual
problems because there is no agreed or logical point of neutrality
against which to measure discrimination. 57 The distinction is explicit
in some anti-discrimination statutes.158
When government acts to accommodate religious freedom gener-
ally, it treats religious and secular interests differently. When gov-
ernment acts to accommodate a particular religious practice, it treats
religious groups differently as well. Thus governments' accommoda-
tions of religious practice can be labeled preferences or privileges or
discrimination, and when costs are imposed on other persons, they
can attack accommodations on equality grounds. Many efforts by
American governments to aid religious groups are met with chal-
lenges under the Establishment Clause, and many challenges suc-
ceed. 59 Under the First Amendment, there are formal tensions be-
tween the Establishment Clause, prohibiting undue religious
151 See id. at 1481-83.
152 494 U.S. at 878.
153 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
15 See supra notes 17, 20, 54, 115 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2000).
156 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Larson v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (The "clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.").
See STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALrIY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2001).
158 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000) (requiring employers to make reasonable accommo-
dations for religious needs).
15 See NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 133, at § 17.4.
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preferences; and the Free Exercise Clause, protecting religious free-
dom.' 60 Canada's and New Zealand's rights provisions pose the same
difficulty.1
6 1
Yet both general and special accommodations are essential to
meaningful religious freedom. As noted above, without general ac-
commodations, religious exercise is banned from public life and dis-
favored compared with other forms of community and expression.
Without accommodations for the distinctive needs of particular
faiths, religions with little political clout fare much less well than
those that have it. Sacred sites of indigenous religions are clear evi-
dence of this proposition. Without some recognition of these sites,
native religions are significantly impaired.
The conceptual core is what religious equality should mean. One
can take the familiar view that general laws equally applied to all per-
sons are the correct point of neutrality. It would follow that religious
tax exemptions or prohibitions on bridges or television towers or
bans on climbing or peyote are discriminations against secular inter-
ests or against other religions. But this seems wrong. The ideal of re-
ligious freedom ought to be equality between religions and at least
equality between religion and other cultural activities. To achieve
this ideal, government must necessarily accommodate religious exer-
cises in ways that a narrower viewpoint labels favoritism. The funda-
mental complaint of adherents of indigenous religions is their long
years of disadvantage compared with Christianity and with secular ac-
tivities. To achieve a reasonable degree of religious equality requires
distinctive accommodations to meet the needs of each faith. Native
American prisoners need sweat lodges, others need copies of the Bi-
ble or the Koran, atheists need none of these. Meeting these relig-
ious needs is forbidden preferences only to a blinkered concept of
religious freedom.
Another variant on the problem is encountered when majori-
tarian preferences are challenged as religious preferences or estab-
lishments. For example, the seven-day week is a rule of religious ori-
gin that is now almost universal. Contests usually surface in disputes
over Sunday-closing laws, but a relentlessly logical secularist can plau-
sibly argue that the calendar ought to be organized to prefer no
faith.' 6 No logic about equality can solve these issues. Canadian and
American jurisprudence has attempted the lame dodge of requiring
160 See id. at § 17.1 ("The Natural Antagonism Between the Two [Religion] Clauses").
161 See supra notes 17, 117 and accompanying text.
162 SeeR. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 311 (Belzil,J., dissenting) ("With the
Lord's Day eliminated, will not all reference in the statutes to Christmas, Easter, or Thanksgiv-
ing be next? What of the use of the Gregorian Calendar? Such an interpretation would make of
the Charter an instrument for the repression of the majority at the instance of every dissident.").
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Sunday laws to have a "secular purpose," satisfied by desire for a day163 ...
of rest. It is more realistic to address the issue in terms of costs and
burdens, as the political process does. An accommodation that
would disrupt the seven-day week itself would impose very large bur-
dens on others and would surely be rejected under any conceivable
protection for religious freedom. One that would exempt dissenters
from punishment for Sunday trading imposes lighter costs on sup-
porters of Sunday closing, but it would rarely involve a competing
command of religion or conscience.' 64
In anti-discrimination law, the closest analogy to religious accom-
modation is law mandating accommodations for disabled citizens.'6 5
These provisions are usually statutory rather than entrenched, thus
subject to political adjustment. They often include explicit cost-
benefit considerations. Their principal difference from statutes re-
quiring religious accommodation is that evaluating the degree of
burden and whether a handicap is genuine is not troubled by the re-
luctance to sit in judgment of religious claims.
Where does this analysis take the concept of religious freedom?
While a broad view of religious equality is the right theory and a use-
ful basis for political debate, it cannot supply an adjudicative solution
to particular problems about which accommodations should be com-
pelled and the larger number that should be allowed in the political
process. Because so many accommodations are unique to one faith,
there is no benchmark for equivalence. Each particular accommoda-
tion will impose its own distinctive costs on nonadherents. The con-
cept of religious equality can provide only an abstract backdrop for
particular decisions. Despite the difficulties posed, weighing a pro-
posed accommodation against the costs it imposes on others is un-
avoidable.
Does this mean that the U.S. Supreme Court erred in abandoning
its previous "compelling interest" test in favor of its discrimination
standard? This question has no easy answer. With RFRA in place,
U.S. federal courts are back in the business of evaluating federal ac-
commodations and their costs under a statutory standard that has a
legislative safety valve if the courts misjudge a case badly enough to
provoke a legislative override. Many American states now have stat-
163 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2
S.C.R. 713; Big M, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
164 See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 599 (holding that economic burden on those who observe an-
other Sabbath did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
1 See McConnell, supra note 130, at 1140.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000); Disability Discrimination Act, 1992, § 11 (Cth)
(Austl.); Human Rights Act, 1993, § 29 (N.Z.). But see Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 114, at
c. 11, § 15(1) (disability discrimination banned in Charter); Eaton v. Brant County Bd. of Educ.,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, 272 (judicial standard of reasonable accommodation of disabilities).
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utes to the same effect. 167 The Sacred Sites executive order and
AIRFA impose duties on the federal Executive to favor accommoda-
tions to Native American religious needs, again subject to possible
legislative alteration.
New Zealand has the potential for a similar general regime under
its Bill of Rights Act, and protection for Maori interests (religious and
other) is considerably stronger, though again subject to legislative re-
view.
Perhaps these arrangements should be left in place long enough
to evaluate their effectiveness. However, the courts of each nation
should not lose track of the ultimate goal of religious equality,
broadly conceived.
CONCLUSION
In recent decades, Maori, Aboriginals, Native Americans, and First
Canadians have had greater success in asserting interests in sacred
sites on government land by political means than by judicial action.
And judicial action has fared better under ordinary statutes than un-
der regimes of judicial finality. Both conclusions seem counterintui-
tive for minority religions that need accommodations very different
from those desired by Christians. They reflect the extraordinary dif-
ficulty of committing the final say on issues of religious accommoda-
tions to judges. Lacking a workable metric to determine the impor-
tance and authenticity of religious claims, judges rest their decisions
almost entirely on the adequacy of secular justifications for denying
religious claims, and most contested claims lose.
Statutes creating presumptive and procedural protections for in-
digenous faiths have a better record of success because judges can
risk requiring an accommodation knowing that if for unforeseen rea-
sons the cost proves too great, it can be adjusted by political means.
Under New Zealand's Resource Management Act, Australia's Abo-
riginal Heritage Act, American RFRAs, or perhaps the Canadian
Heritage Act, indigenous religions have the opportunity to obtain an
accommodation by much easier means than gaining a specific statu-
tory right, particularly when a statutory right would have to come
from a national legislature. Victories under these laws can be politi-
cally overridden, and in dramatic cases like Hindmarsh Island this
has come to pass. Critics thus seek entrenched rights, insulated from
politics. But the American experience before 1990, with an en-
trenched and strongly worded right on paper that almost never ob-
tained judicial accommodations in practice, should temper their
judgment.
167 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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Among the four nations, Maori rights are best protected for the
obvious reason that Maori constitute a much larger share of the elec-
torate than their counterparts (although there is considerable relig-
ious diversity among Maori). 68 As a device for retaining political
override but minimizing its impact, Canada's section 33 right may be
best because the political cost of invoking it seems unusually high, yet
judges know it is there and may thus be less risk-averse than their pre-
1990 American counterparts. However, Canadian judges have given
less weight to religious claims under the Charter than decisionmakers
in the other nations, so section 33's insularity has protected secular
interests rather than religious.' 69 Meaningful legal protection for in-
digenous faiths in the four nations is relatively new. With experience,
we shall gain a better understanding of how effective are the various
legal regimes to protect Native sacred sites and religious freedom
generally.
168 See 2001 census data, at http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/external/web/ProdServ.nsf
/htmldocs/Maori (last visited Jan. 9, 2003) (one-seventh of the population is Maori, but few
name Maori religion as their religious affiliation).
169 See supra accompanying text at note 117.
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